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Abstract 
What must laypersons understand about science to allow them to make sound decisions on 
science-related issues? Relying on recent developments in social epistemology, this paper argues 
that scientific education should have the goal not of bringing laypersons' understanding of 
science closer to that of expert insiders, but rather of cultivating the kind of competence 
characteristic of “competent outsiders” (Feinstein 2011). Moreover, it argues that philosophers of 
science have an important role to play in attempts to promote this kind of understanding, but that 
to successfully fulfill this role, they will have to approach central questions in the field 
differently. 
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1. Introduction 
The division of cognitive labor brings about extreme inequalities in scientific knowledge and 
understanding, raising significant concerns about the public’s ability to make sound decisions on 
science-related issues. Addressing these concerns involves combating public ignorance and 
misunderstandings about science. But what must the lay public understand about science to allow 
it to make sound decisions on science-related issues? And what is the role of philosophers of 
science in organized attempts to advance this understanding? 
For brevity, I refer to what the public must know or understand to allow for sound 
science-related decisions as the public’s epistemic needs. Note that focusing thus on the public’s 
ability to make sound decisions may lead us to ignore important classes of significant truths. Left 
out will be all truths of pure epistemic significance (Kitcher 2001), knowledge of which is 
intrinsically valuable, but which are devoid of any practical significance. Moreover, we shall 
ignore concerns about public understanding of science other than the ability to make sound 
decisions, such as concerns about the effect of ignorance on laypersons’ ability to make 
autonomous decisions (Faden and Beauchamp 1986). Nonetheless, this formulation allows us to 
address the most prominent concern about public ignorance regarding science: that it prevents 
both individual laypersons and democratic communities from making good decisions on science-
related questions (Anderson 2011).  
The paper defends two main claims. First, that scientific education should not ultimately 
aim to bring laypersons' understanding of science closer to that of experts’ understanding of their 
own field of expertise. Instead, the goal should be to cultivate “competent outsiders” with respect 
to science (Feinstein 2011); what a competent outsider needs to understand about science is not a 
subset of what expert scientists know about their field. And second, that philosophers of science 
 
 
have an important role in attempts to promote this kind of understanding, but that they have to 
approach central questions of the field differently to successfully fulfill this role. 
In section 2, I distinguish between two approaches to the public’s epistemic needs: the 
dominant Scientific Content (SC) approach and the Scientific Division of Labor (SDoL) 
approach. Sections 3 and 4 use recent developments in social epistemology to clarify the 
“competent outsider” notion central to the SDoL approach and to defend its characterization of 
the public’s epistemic needs. Section 5 discusses possible objections to and misinterpretations of 
the SDoL approach. Section 6 discusses the role of philosophers of science in attempts to 
promote understanding characteristic of the competent outsider. 
 
2. Approaches to the Public Understanding of Science 
Attempts to improve public understanding of science have a long history, as do debates about 
how to conceptualize the goals of these attempts (Bromme and Goldman 2014). Various 
approaches have employed different definitions of public understanding or scientific literacy and 
suggested different answers to questions about measuring and improving public understanding of 
science. I distinguish here between two broad families of approaches, suggesting different 
answers to our question about the public’s epistemic needs. The Scientific Content (SC) approach 
is the dominant approach to the public understanding of science. It focuses on measuring and 
improving public understanding of scientific texts and the “content of science”—the kind of 
things one can read about in typical scientific publications or scientific journalism—aiming to 
improve the public’s understanding of scientific concepts, theories, facts, and methods. What is 
common to the approaches in this varied group is the idea that what the public needs to 
understand about science is a subset of what scientific experts understand about their own field 
 
 
of expertise. This family of approaches includes those that employ the “deficit model,” assuming 
that scientists not only have scientific information needed by laypersons but are also sensitive to 
the public’s epistemic needs; such approaches therefore adopt a “one-way, top-down 
communication process” whereby scientists “with all the required information—[fill] the 
knowledge vacuum in the scientifically illiterate general public as they [see] fit” (Miller 2001, 
116). SC approaches also include some dominant rivals of the deficit model, in as much as they 
reject that model’s assumptions about the process that determines what scientific contents should 
be communicated to the public but not the idea that what the public ultimately needs to 
understand is a subset of what expert scientists should know about their own field (Miller 2001).  
 Among several alternatives to the SC approach, I focus on one that emphasizes the 
importance of the division of cognitive labor between expert scientists and laypersons. I call this 
the Scientific Division of Labor (SDoL) approach.
1
 Without denying the importance of 
understanding scientific contents, the SDoL approach maintains that because of the division of 
cognitive labor, what laypersons must understand about science is not a subset of expert 
scientists' knowledge about their field of expertise. According to views within the SDoL 
approach, an important part of what laypersons need to understand about science is the scientific 
division of cognitive labor. Moreover, such views maintain that because of this division of labor, 
laypersons need to employ different forms of reasoning from those employed by experts 
(Bromme, Kienhues, and Porsch 2010).  
                                                          
1  Kitcher (1990) originally used the term “the division of cognitive labor” to discuss relations 
within the scientific community, but the term can also be applied, as here, to relations between 
laypersons and scientists.  
 
 
 I use recent epistemological accounts of authority-based belief to motivate and clarify the 
central claim of the SDoL approach: that because of this division of labor, what laypersons must 
understand departs significantly from what the SC approach suggests. I argue that in considering 
what scientific claims to believe, laypersons are subject to different cognitive norms than 
scientific insiders and thus, appropriately use different forms of reasoning and different cognitive 
resources than do scientific insiders. Therefore, what laypersons need to understand about 
science is not a subset of what expert scientists know about their field. 
 
3. Competent Outsiders, Expert and Marginal Insiders  
Feinstein (2011) nicely expresses the idea that scientific education should be more 
sensitive to this division of cognitive labor, complaining that scientific education currently 
produces “marginal insiders.” “These are students who have sat through a long parade of 
concepts and theories. . . . Their understanding of science is fairly primitive. . . . A small number 
of them will go on to be real scientific insiders, but for most, this glimpse is all they get” (181). 2  
Feinstein suggests that we should rethink the goals of scientific literacy, seeing “science 
literate people” not as insiders but as “competent outsiders with respect to science.” These are 
“people who learned to recognize the moments when science has some bearing on their needs 
and interests and to interact with sources of scientific expertise in ways that help them achieve 
their own goals” (2011, 180; original emphasis). 
The idea that scientifically-literate people are “competent outsiders” can be variously 
interpreted, including in ways compatible with the SC approach: thus, what distinguishes 
                                                          
2 Feinstein does not use the term “division of cognitive labor.” However, his discussion of 
“scientific insiders” and “competent outsiders” implies this division. 
 
 
competent outsiders from both expert insiders and “marginal insiders” is the kind of scientific 
facts, theories, concepts, and methodologies that each understands. Here, what competent 
outsiders understand is a subset of what expert insiders understand, but a different subset from 
what marginal insiders understand.  
An alternative interpretation suggests that the difference between expert insiders and 
competent outsiders goes further: that outsiders and insiders might need to employ different 
forms of reasoning (Bromme and Goldman 2014) and that better competence as an outsider 
requires something quite different from becoming more like the expert. Recent developments in 
social epistemology will help to articulate, clarify, and motivate the claim that we should 
promote such outsider competence.  
Central to the distinction between appropriate forms of reasoning for expert insiders and 
for lay outsiders is the concept of belief on authority (Keren 2007; Zagzebski 2012).
3
 The 
general idea, developed below, is that while competent outsiders should often form beliefs on the 
authority of insiders, expert insiders, because they serve as authorities, should not form beliefs 
this way on questions within their field of expertise.
4
 Accordingly, different forms of reasoning 
                                                          
3 It is important to note that this distinction between insiders and outsiders is relative to fields of 
specialization. Most laypersons are outsiders with respect to all scientific fields, but no scientist 
is an insider in all fields.  
4
 Even though expert insiders should not form beliefs on issues within their narrow field of 
expertise on the authority of other expert insiders, this does not mean they should not form 
beliefs this way on matters beyond their fields, on which, as footnote 3 suggests, they are 
outsiders. Accordingly, the above claim is compatible with Hardwig’s (1991) claim that trust and 
deference to authority are essential to science.  
 
 
are appropriate for insiders and outsiders. Insiders and outsiders are subject to different norms 
for reasoning, and appropriately respond to different kinds of reasons for belief. Outsiders 
appropriately use types of evidence on which it is inappropriate for insiders to rely; outsiders, but 
not insiders, should also sometimes refrain from basing their beliefs on certain other types of 
available evidence.  
  
4. Believing on Authority, Following the Consensus 
Consider first a form of reliable evidence on which outsiders, but not insiders, may 
appropriately base belief. In forming beliefs, the best epistemic policy for laypersons often 
involves asking themselves not directly what proposition to believe but rather whether and whom 
to trust. This follows from the obvious fact that attempts to further the public’s understanding of 
science, however successful, do not—and are not intended to—change the basic fact that 
cognitive labor is divided in our societies and that scientists and laypersons have different roles 
within this division. As long as this division persists, experts will often be placed in a superior 
position for judging matters within their field of expertise, and the best epistemic policy for 
laypersons will often be to form their beliefs by trusting experts, rather than weighing the 
evidence themselves (Hardwig 1991; Zagzebski 2012; Keren 2014a).  
Some early treatments of epistemic trust assumed that trust is blind, and not evidence-
based (Hardwig 1991; Faulkner 2007). However, recent literature in social epistemology shows 
that such trust need not be blind, both in the sense that laypersons often have available evidence 
for assessing experts' trustworthiness (Goldman 2001) and in the sense that relying on this 
evidence is not incompatible with trust (Keren 2014a).  
 
 
What sources of evidence should laypersons rely upon when considering whether to trust 
experts? Information about patterns of agreement and disagreement among purported experts and 
authorities comprises a primary source of reliable evidence for laypersons (Goldman 2001; 
Miller 2013). Certain patterns of consensus among experts provide strong reasons to trust those 
experts, while if scholars in a field fail to reach any substantial agreement on almost anything, as 
some suggest is the case in philosophy (Chalmers 2015), that might be a reason not to trust them 
on such contested questions. 
Agreement and consensus patterns can also provide reliable evidence to expert insiders 
about matters within their expertise. However, insiders are subject to scientific norms 
disallowing reliance on such evidence in many contexts.
 
Thus, it would seem strange and 
inappropriate for an expert scientist to respond to a challenge to her claim on matters within her 
specialization—at a scientific conference, say, or in referee reports—by saying that it is justified 
because it is a majority view among experts (while it is appropriate for laypersons to justify their 
scientific views by appealing to such scientific consensus). In such contexts, and on such 
matters, expert insiders should not judge a claim based on the consensus within the field, even 
though consensus among other experts can be a reliable mark of trustworthiness even for an 
insider (so reliable that, of all evidence available to her, this may be the most reliable indication 
of truth).  
Beyond the seeming inappropriateness of certain appeals to consensus, further indication 
of the existence and scope of norms disallowing such appeals comes from consideration of the 
function such norms might play.
5
 If collegial consensus within their field may be such a reliable 
indicator of truth, why should experts not form beliefs on matters within their field based on this 
                                                          
5 For further discussion, see Keren (2017). 
 
 
consensus? Scientific norms disallowing this are not general epistemic norms against forming 
beliefs in unreliable ways: even for experts, this way of forming beliefs is sometimes the most 
reliable. Rather, such norms serve a different function: their point, I submit, is to allow 
consensus among experts to be a reliable sign of trustworthiness,
6
 which requires that experts 
themselves not form their beliefs, on questions within their expertise, by following the consensus 
among their colleagues. 
To illustrate this, consider an ideal community of experts trying to determine the truth 
value of some proposition. Assume (unrealistically) that this community satisfies the conditions 
of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (CJT): if each scientist forms her judgment independently, she has 
a greater-than-fifty-percent chance of being right; moreover, each scientist’s chances of being 
right are statistically independent of the chances of her colleagues being right. Because this 
community satisfies the conditions of CJT, the chances of the majority’s opinion being right 
increases rapidly with the size of the community (Cohen 1986). Accordingly, an individual 
scientist who formed her belief by following the majority would have a higher chance of being 
right than one who made her judgment independently. However, the reliability of the 
community’s majority view would rapidly decrease the more scientists based their belief on that 
majority, for then there would be fewer independent expert judgments underpinning the 
reliability of the majority opinion. Thus, communal norms against member’s beliefs, reliably-
formed based on the majority view, play an important role in preserving the reliability of that 
                                                          
6 This claim has some affinity with Zollman (2010). However, while Zollman focuses on the 
positive communal effects of limiting scientists’ access to information, my claim concerns the 
function of scientific norms disallowing reliance on certain kinds of information even when 
accessible.   
 
 
view and allow nonmembers to form reliable beliefs on the basis of the expert community’s 
majority view. 
While this example is obviously unrealistic, a well-functioning scientific community 
need not satisfy the conditions of CJT for scientific norms disallowing deference to the majority 
view to contribute to the reliability of that view. Well-functioning scientific communities 
normally share two important characteristics with our idealized community: first, the chance of a 
typical member of such a community being right on a proposition is normally lower than that of 
the community-consensus being right; second, by basing their belief on the evidence rather than 
the consensus among their colleagues, typical members of such communities contribute to the 
reliability of the majority view.  
It might be objected that this only shows that it would be bad if all insiders relied upon 
the consensus within their field, but not that insiders should not rely upon it. Why should it not 
be as good, or even better, if some relied on the consensus and some disputed it? Claims that 
diversity is what matters for increased community reliability, and that several different normative 
recommendations might achieve epistemically beneficial diversification (Solomon 2006), might 
seem to support this objection. However, even if Solomon is correct about most norms of 
diversification, norms against following the consensus have a unique function in promoting 
reliability. For scientists who simply follow the majority view no longer contribute to its 
reliability. Consider a community of which half is “independents,” forming beliefs on their own 
weighing of the evidence, and half is equally divided between “followers,” following the 
consensus among the first half, and “dissenters.” In such a community, some diversity is 
preserved by the equal distribution between followers and dissenters; moreover, if the majority 
view among independents is reliable, then so is the majority view among the community as a 
 
 
whole. Nonetheless, the second half of the community does not contribute anything to the 
reliability of the community view; ceteris paribus, it would be better if all were independents.  
Thus, scientific norms ruling out reliance by experts on the community consensus allow a 
community of experts to serve as reliable authorities for others. But while expert insiders should 
not base their beliefs on such information, it can be most helpful to outsiders in determining 
whether to trust scientists, and which scientists to trust. That is, such information would be useful 
to outsiders, if only they understood how to use it: If they understood what type of information 
about expert consensus is available, how to obtain it, and what its significance might be. 
Moreover, they would need to understand that they may legitimately rely on such information, 
even if insiders may not. This understanding is a central component of being a competent 
outsider with respect to science.  
So far I have emphasized evidence that can and should be used by outsiders, but that 
insiders should not use. Recent discussions of the concept of epistemic authority suggest that the 
reverse is also true. I will not elaborate on this, as the account of belief on authority has been 
discussed elsewhere (Raz 1986; Keren 2007, 2014b; Zagzebski 2012) and as the rationale for 
thinking that this establishes a difference between scientific insiders and lay outsiders is similar 
to the consensus case explored above. The basic idea is this: when I, a layperson, have reason to 
believe that an expert is in a better position to judge than I am, and that she appropriately 
responds to the evidence available to her, I ought to form my belief on her authority. That 
involves treating her judgment as providing me with a preemptive reason for belief (Zagzebski 
2012; Keren 2014a): a reason for believing as she does, which is also a reason for not forming 
my belief on the basis of my own weighing of certain evidence available to me. Thus, if I have 
first-order evidence relevant to p, I should not form my belief regarding p on the basis of this 
 
 
evidence but rather should simply believe as the expert does. The point is not merely that I might 
not be able to understand the significance of the evidence. Even if I do, because the expert has 
more evidence and is a better judge of it, I should believe as she does and allow her judgment to 
preempt mine. Doing so allows my belief to properly respond to the better evidence possessed by 
her and to better fulfill the twin epistemic goals of believing truth and avoiding error (Zagzebski 
2012). 
In contrast, expert insiders are expected not to take others’ testimony as preemptive 
reasons for belief on matters within their expertise. They should not do so even though, within 
scientific communities, some might enjoy the kind of epistemic superiority over others that 
would mean that the latter's beliefs would be better-founded if based on the former’s authority. 
As with forming beliefs by following the consensus, scientific norms rule-out such deference to 
authority not because it cannot be a good way for experts to obtain knowledge but because 
forming beliefs this way undermines the ability of the scientific community to function as an 
authority for laypersons. Both preemptively believing on authority and believing on the 
consensus in the field can be reliable ways of obtaining knowledge; but if experts in a specialty 
formed their beliefs interdependently in these ways, the diversity and independence on which 
increased community reliability depends (Cohen 1986; Goldman 2001; Longino 2002; Miller 
2013) would be undermined.  
Thus, insiders and outsiders should employ different forms of reasoning to obtain 
knowledge and understanding about scientific matters. An important part of the information that 
laypersons need to have and understand to make sound decisions on science-related issues—to 
be able to determine which scientific claims to accept and, primarily, whether and which 
scientists to trust—is information that scientific experts should not rely on. What the former must 
 
 
understand is therefore not a subset of the information the latter need to know about their field of 
expertise.  
 
5. Objections  
 Before considering a number of objections to the SDoL approach defended here, it is 
important to clarify what follows from it: while rejecting the SC approach, it does not imply that 
understanding scientific content is unimportant for promoting outsider competence. Arguably, it 
is important.  But the discussion does suggest that attempts to advance scientific literacy 
focusing only on improving the understanding of scientific contents are unlikely to contribute 
much to this kind of competence. For outsider competence requires efficient use of different 
forms of reasoning and cognitive resources than those used by experts.  
Moreover, without a proper understanding of the division of cognitive labor, improved 
understanding of scientific content may sometimes hinder laypersons’ ability to make sound 
decisions on scientific matters. A better understanding of scientific contents will neither turn 
laypersons into experts nor change the fact that the best way for laypersons to determine which 
scientific claims to believe is often to rely on the authority of experts. Worse, a better 
understanding of scientific contents, unaccompanied by a proper understanding of the division of 
cognitive labor might tempt some laypersons to base beliefs about scientific issues on their own 
weighing of scientific evidence rather than on the authority of experts. This is reinforced by the 
norms underlying many educational systems, equating cognitive sophistication with overcoming 
 
 
the division of cognitive labor and thinking more like the experts (Bromme, Kienhues, and 
Porsch 2010).
7
  
It might be objected that while laypersons may obtain knowledge of scientific facts by 
believing on the authority of scientists, this will not contribute to their understanding of science 
(Jäger 2016). A possible response to this involves questioning the assumption that the epistemic 
relation that laypersons need to have to scientific contents is one of understanding, rather than of 
knowledge (Slater, Huxster, and Bresticker 2017). However, effective reliance on science is 
likely to require both knowledge and understanding. So a more promising response is to note that 
knowledge obtained by deferring to expert authority does not guarantee, but can and often does 
contribute to, understanding, even if it involves preemptively believing the expert (Croce, 2017). 
Indeed, it is difficult to see how to promote lay understanding of science without laypeople 
believing at least some things on the authority of others.  
Finally, it might be objected that laypersons already have sufficient understanding of the 
scientific division of cognitive labor. Anderson writes: “While citizens have the capacity to 
reliably judge trustworthiness, many Americans appear ill-disposed to do so” (2011, 145). 
According to this kind of view, it is motivational factors, rather than lack of understanding, that 
prevents laypersons from making sound decisions on scientific issues (Kahan et al. 2012). 
                                                          
7  This temptation for laypersons to form judgments based on their own weighing of scientific 
evidence may explain recent findings that increased education sometimes increases the gap 
between laypersons’ opinions and the scientific consensus: it may for instance explain why 
political polarization on climate change increases with education (Kahan et al. 2012) and why 
among Republicans, concerns about anthropogenic climate change decrease with education 
(Hamilton 2011). 
 
 
However, while I do not deny the importance of motivation, I doubt whether we should be so 
optimistic about the public’s understanding of important aspects of the division of cognitive 
labor or the extent to which scientific education promotes this understanding. Unfortunately, we 
do not know enough about this aspect of the public understanding of science; not enough 
research has been done (Bromme, Kienhues, and Porsch 2010). Studies trying to determine 
whether lack of understanding of science contributes to lack of concern about anthropogenic 
climate change typically test the kind of understanding advocated by the SC approach, but not by 
the SDoL approach (Slater, Huxster, and Bresticker 2017). Much more empirical research is 
needed to determine the extent of lay understanding of the scientific division of cognitive labor 
and the extent to which better understanding could contribute to lay decision-making on 
scientific issues. However, anecdotal evidence and initial empirical studies are suggestive. 
Consider lay understanding of how information about the extent of consensus within a scientific 
community can be used to determine whether and whom to trust. What do college students know 
about the availability of reliable information on consensus patterns within scientific 
communities? Do they know how to find and use such information when it is available? To what 
extent does college education promote their ability to use such information? Anecdotal evidence 
from my classes—where I ask students to determine the extent of consensus among scientists on 
politically contested scientific questions and to report their findings in class—suggests that 
students’ levels of understanding of these questions is extremely low; it suggests, moreover, that 
higher education hardly prepares students for this kind of task. An empirical study systematically 
examining student performance on and reactions to similar tasks seems to confirm my anecdotal 
evidence, indicating, for instance, that in spite of the usefulness of such information, students 
 
 
have very little experience trying to determine the extent of consensus among scientists (Keren, 
Liviatan and Barzilai 2018). 
  
6. Implications for the Philosophy of Science 
To conclude, let us consider the role that philosophers of science should play in 
promoting the kind of understanding of science required for the outsider competence advocated 
by the SDoL approach. If what has been said so far is correct, philosophers of science should 
arguably play an important role in such attempts. One of the central tasks of the field is 
traditionally to explain when, and in virtue of what, scientists and the scientific community have 
authority on scientific questions. Therefore, insights from the philosophy of science can make an 
important contribution to the understanding characteristic of competent outsiders. However, for 
philosophers of science to fulfill this role, how they address some central questions of the 
discipline must change.  
Consider, for instance, the demarcation of science. This question—how to draw the line 
separating science from pseudoscience—is clearly of great concern to competent outsiders. As 
Laudan and others have seen, this question interests us primarily because of the authority that 
scientists enjoy: because, when scientists make scientific claims, “we generally believe them” 
(Laudan 1983, 111; my emphasis). But in asking whether and how science can be demarcated, 
philosophers of science have often not been sensitive to the concerns and perspective of the 
outsider nor to how these differ from those of the insider. Take Laudan as an example: In 
claiming that the very question of how to demarcate science is spurious, the line of demarcation, 
which Laudan is after, and declares nonexistent, is not the kind that could be helpful to an 
 
 
outsider trying to determine whom to believe. It would be useful only to someone trying to 
determine directly what claims to believe.  
Laudan’s discussion does not merely ignore the epistemic needs of the outsider; it is also 
blind to the existence of epistemically significant questions facing the outsider that are distinct 
from those facing the insider. While Laudan is after a criterion that would shed light on the 
credibility of science, his discussion is insensitive to the distinction between credible persons and 
credible statements. It is this insensitivity that allows him to claim that once we answer epistemic 
questions such as "when is a claim well confirmed?" the problem of demarcation becomes 
spurious and there is no further question of epistemic significance to be asked (1983, 124). But if 
my claims here are correct, this is a very significant mistake. There remains a distinct and highly 
significant epistemic question about when a person, a scientist, rather than a scientific claim, 
should be trusted and believed. This is the epistemic question that the competent outsider needs 
to grapple with. Laudan’s discussion, failing to recognize it as a distinct question, therefore 
ignores it.  
If the SDoL approach is correct, then the question of when scientists should be trusted 
should be of primary concern in attempts to improve public understanding of science. It is also a 
question on which philosophers of science can and should shed some light. But In order to do so, 
they need to avoid the kind of mistake Laudan makes and that also underlies the failure of the SC 
approach. Because of the division of cognitive labor, scientific insiders and lay outsiders have 
different epistemic concerns, are governed by different epistemic norms, and properly rely on 
different kinds of evidence. This difference is ignored both by the SC approach and by Laudan.
8
 
                                                          
8 Many of Laudan’s recent critics also exhibit a lack of sensitivity to the difference between the 
concerns and perspectives of outsiders and those of insiders. Thus, Pigliucci (2013) rejects 
 
 
If my claims here are valid, this difference should not be ignored within attempts to promote 
public understanding of science nor within the philosophical discussion of the demarcation of 
science. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Laudan’s insistence that a successful line of demarcation should be formulated in terms of a set 
of necessary and jointly-sufficient conditions, claiming that a fuzzy line, drawn based on degrees 
of empirical testing and theoretical soundness, would nonetheless be useful. However, Pigliucci 
does not ask whether such a line can be useful to insiders, outsiders, or to both. Moreover, 
because drawing the line requires an evaluation of the comparative empirical support for 
theories, it is unclear whether such a line could be useful to lay outsiders. 
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